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Life Tenant as Trustee of Corpus for Capital
Gain Purposes?-Remedial Section 641(c)
a Solution
It is a well-established principle of law that taxes on capital gain
are paid by the cestui or trustee of the capital asset.' There are three
factual situations present in the taxation of such gain. First, if the
property is owned in fee, the owner is required to file a return and to
pay the tax on the capital gain.2 Secondly, if the equitable title is
broken into several estates-for instance, life estate with remainder
over-and an express or implied trust established, 'the trustee is re-
quired to file a return for all capital gain received.3 The third factual
situation is illustrated in the recent case of United States v. De Bon-
champs,4 in which a life estate containing broad powers to consume
the corpus for support, comfort and maintenance was devised with
remainder following. No trust, express or implied, resulted from the
devise. Thereupon the life tenant sold portions of the estate and
realized a capital gain. The vexing problem created by the nature of
the devise was whether the life tenant should be taxed as owner or
as trustee of the corpus for the capital gain realized. The answer to
this problem was not and still is not included in the present Internal
Revenue Code. In a split decision the court chose to tax the life holder
as trustee of the estate. The dissenting opinion reasoned that the life
tenant should not be taxed as either owner or fiduciary.5
Before further investigation of the De Bonchamps and other similar
cases can be attempted, a brief review of judicial history concerning
three important areas should be made. First, the history of the courts
concerning code expansion; second, the courts' past attitude towards
treating a life tenant as trustee; finally, the fundamental duties of
a trustee.
I. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF TAXING POwER GENERALLY
The inherent power of Congress to use its taxing power to the
fullest is evidenced by certain broadly worded sections of the Internal
Revenue Code.8 The courts, too, have often fostered this attitude in
holding a taxpayer liable "in accordance with the legislative design
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1201, 1202.
2. Ibid.
3. Hallowell v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 536 (3rd Cir. 1947).
4. 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960).
5. Id at 135.
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 61 (a), 261, 262.
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to reach all gain constitutionally taxable unless specifically ex-
cluded. .. ."
This far-reaching phrase has been used by the courts to include as
income within Section 61 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19548
insider profits,9 punitive damages,10 money received in settlement of
a law suit," retirement payments, 12 alimony, s tips,14 room and board
furnished by employer, 5 windfall gain resulting from currency deval-
uation,8 and prizes won by contestants. 17 In these decisions, the courts
have repeatedly referred specifically to the all-inclusive phrase found
within this section, that gross income includes all "income from what-
ever source derived."'I s
The reasoning in United States v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,' 9 a case in
which punitive damages were included as income, is illustrative of the
courts' propensity to liberally interpret the broadly worded sections
of the code in favor of the government. Prior to the final determina-
tion of this case, the Tax Court chose not to include these damages
as income. In the interim, the 1954 Code was enacted omitting any
reference to the taxability of such gain. At first glance, this appeared
to be an affirmation of the Tax Court's holding; but paradoxically, the
higher court found these punitive damages taxable, reasoning that
Congress showed no intention to carve out such an exception. 20
On the other hand, there are numerous cases holding that the Inter-
nal Revenue Code should not be expanded by mere implication, these
cases stating that the literal meaning of the words employed should
not be expanded beyond their clear import.2' This school of thought
7. General American Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434, 436 (1955).
8. The Section reads: Gross Income Defined
(a) General definition.-Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle,
gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including
(but not limited to) the following items: ....
9. General American Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955).
10. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
11. Ibid.
12. Fisher v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1932).
13. Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953).
14. Nazzareno D. Cesanelli, 8 T.C. 776 (1947).
15. Olin 0. Ellis, 6 T.C. 138 (1947).
16. Willard Helburn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1954).
17. Turner v. Commissioner, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 54,142 (1954).
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61 (a).
19. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
20. Ibid.
21. E.g., Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1930); United States v. Merriam,
263 U.S. 179 (1923); United States v. Field, 225 U.S. 257 (1921). Prior to these
cases was Smietanka v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 257 U.S. 602 (1922) which
stated the general intent of Congress was to read into the Code only language
which could be reasonably construed to effect it.
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reasons that all doubts as to the construction of a code provision
should be construed in favor of the taxpayer,22 emphasizing that
courts should not legislate.2 3 In the case of Helvering z'. Clifford, 2
the dissent by Mr. Justice Roberts stated:
No such dictum as that Congress has in the income tax law
attempted to exercise its power to the fullest extent will justify
the extension of a plain provision to an object of taxation not
embraced within it. If the contrary were true, the courts might
supply whatever they considered a deficiency in the sweep of a
taxing act. I [Roberts] cannot construe the court's opinion as
attempting lessY.
This statement reflects the fear that many courts possess of the
propriety of reading implications into the statute in order to supply
a tax shortcoming. More important, they have been afraid of the
courts' usurpation of legislative powers.2 6 The result is that these
courts leave such remedies with Congress by simply absolving the tax-
payer from liability. In the extreme, there is at least one court that
has gone even further by excluding a taxpayer clearly within
the letter of the law when the court felt that taxation would not be
within the spirit of the law.2 7
Although the decisions are not uniform, the overwhelming trend
in the past few decades has been towards expansion.28 It would be
prohibitive for Congress to attempt to codify and exhaust all possible
taxable events; therefore, Congress has given a considerable amount
of discretion to the courts. Furthermore, there have been times when
strict construction of the Code has clearly created greater absurdities
than a liberal interpretation. With this in mind, the second consid-
eration will be investigated.
II. TREATMENT OF LIFE TENANT AS TRUSTEE GENERALLY
The vexing problem of treating a life tenant as trustee has been
the subject of extensive litigation.29 The De Bonchcmps case deals
22. United States v. Merriam, supra note 21; United States v. Field, supra
note 21; Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917); Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264
(1901).
23. Smietanka v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 257 U.S. 602 (1922).
24. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
25. Id. at 342.
26. E.g., Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930); United States v.
Merriam, 263 U.S. 179 (1923) ; United States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921).
27. Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264 (1901).
28. White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281 (1938).
29. E.g., King v. Hawley, 113 Cal. App. 534, 248 P.2d 491 (1952); Skellen-
ger v. England, 81 Cal. App. 176, 253 Pac. 191 (1927); Bienvenu v. First Nat'l
Bank, 17 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1941).
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directly with this problem of regarding the life tenant as trustee for
tax purposes. The authorities are in accord in not classifying a life
tenant as a trustee in the true legal sense.30 The creation of a techni-
cal trustee requires express or implied language in the devise or
grant. 3
Courts that have treated the life holder as trustee have done so by
expressly stating that since the duties of the life tenant are similar
to those of a trustee, he holds an interest in the nature of a trust or as
quasi-trustee, 32 and therefore, should do nothing to prejudice, destroy
or defeat the remainderman's interest.3 3 These decisions can be sum-
marized by the reasoning in Bienvenu v. First Nat'l Bank,3- which
stated: "Because of the duty resting on the life tenant to preserve and
protect the estate in remainder, the relation of the life tenant to the
remainderman has been recognized by this court to be to a certain
extent a fiduciary one and termed an implied or quasitrusteeship. ' 5
Contrariwise, there are numerous cases holding that a normal life
tenant should not be deemed a trustee or quasi-trustee. 6 The courts
foster the idea that no trust or form thereof should be created except
when it clearly appears that such was the intent of the grantor.3 7 The
courts state that if the trust is not provided for in the devise, the
subsequent decree of distribution should not have the effect of creat-
ing such an interest.38 This point is well-taken since the legal life
interest is recognized in law as being distinct from that of the equit-
able interest, assuming the grantor does not state his intent to com-
bine the two. Moreover, the two interests are taxed separately in the
eyes of the law.3 9
30. Hart v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1932) ; Estate of Larson, 261
Wis. 206, 52 N.W.2d 141 (1952); 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 27, at 217
(1951); Restatement (Second), Trusts § 54 (1939).
31. E.g., Estate of King, 144 Wash. 281, 275 Pac. 82 (1929). See Restatement
(Second), Trusts §§ 23, 54 (1959).
32. E.g., Hart v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1932); Ferguson v.
Forstmann, 25 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1928); King v. Hawley, 113 Cal. App. 534, 248
P.2d 491 (1952); Hardy v. Mayhew, 158 Cal. 95, 110 Pac. 113 (1910).
33. Edwards v. Puckett, 196 Tenn. 560, 268 S.W.2d 582 (1954); Morrow v.
Person, 195 Tenn. 370, 259 S.W.2d 665 (1953). But cf., Attebury v. Prentice, 158
Neb. 795, 65 N.W.2d 138 (1954).
34. 17 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1941).
35. Id. at 260. (Emphasis added).
36. E.g., Mary M. Shea, 31 B.T.A. 513 (1934); Skellenger v. England, 81 Cal.
App. 176, 253 Pac. 191 (1927); Bogle v. N.C.R.R., 51 N.C. 408 (1859); Welsh's
Estate, 239 Pa. 616, 86 Atl. 1091 (1913). See also Restatement, Property § 204
comment (a) (1936).
37. Estate of King, 144 Wash. 281, 275 Pac. 82 (1929).
38. Ibid.
39. 6 Merten, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 36.01 (Zimvet ed. 1957).
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The impropriety of treating a life tenant as trustee or quasi-trustee
was recognized more than a century ago by a North Carolina court
which said that the whole estate is divided into two sectors, life
tenant and remainderman, each holding legal title to his respective
part for his own use.40 There is no separation of the legal from the
beneficial estate in respect to either part; therefore, it is untenable
to say that the life holder maintains the legal estate for the benefit of
another.41 The renowned writers on the subject are in accord with
this view.4 2 Exemplary of this is a comment in the Restatement of
Property.
The relationship between the persons having respectively the
present and future interests in a thing other than land cannot
be defined accurately by analogizing it either to the trustee-
beneficiary relation or to the relation between persons having like
present and future interests in the land. The fact that each has
legal ownership of an interest for his own use makes the trustee
beneficiary analogy sometimes inapt.
43
One solution to the problem is to require the life holder to file a
bond, thereby creating a debtor-creditor relationship between life
tenant and remainderman. 44 However, the life tenant with the power
to consume the corpus generally is not required to file a bond since
he is not required to preserve the corpus.45 In Kirkpatricl's Estate,40
a will provided for the residue of the estate to go to the spouse for
life, according her full possession and control. In the devise, a waiver
of the statute requiring a bond to be filed was stipulated. Although
no bond was filed, the court held that the relationship between the life
tenant and the remainderman was that of debtor and creditor .4 The
creation of such a relationship precludes the courts from applying the
trustee label to the life holder, for a debtor is not a fiduciary.
PoweZrs Estate48 promulgated the rule for jurisdictions that do not
require bonds to be filed by ordinary life holders. There the wife was
given the entire estate for life with power to expend as much as she
needed, including principal, for her support. The Court held that a
40. Bogle v. N.C.R.R., 51 N.C. 408, 419 (1859).
41. Id. at 409, 420.
42. Restatement, Property, op. cit. supra note 36; 1 Bogert, supra note 30 at
218.
43. Restatement, Property, op.cit. supra note 36.
44. In re Hays' Estate, 358 Pa. 38, 55 A.2d 763 (1947); Kirkpatrick's Estate,
284 Pa. 583, 131 Atl. 361 (1925).
45. In re Sanford's Estate, 83 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1948); In re Hays' Estate, supra
note 44. Contra, Vaughn v. Vaughn, 238 Miss. 342, 118 So. 2d 620 (1960).
46. 284 Pa. 583, 131 Atl. 361 (1925).
47. Ibid.
48. 340 Pa. 401, 17 A.2d 391 (1941).
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debtor-creditor relationship was created although no bond was re-
quired by law or the devise. There was no fiduciary relationship and
the rights of the respective parties were in no way altered.49 Although
the power to consume was granted in the devise, the rule applies also,
according to the opinion, even to life holders without power to con-
sume. 0
III. GENERAL DUTIES OF A TRUSTEE
The only justification in equating a life holder with a quasi-trustee
arises from the fact that both interests at least impliedly have similar
duties towards the remainderman. 51
The primary duty of the trustee is "to administer the trust solely
in the interest of the beneficiaries."52 A trustee is a person who under-
takes to act in the interest of others. Any violation of this duty of
loyalty53 will subject the trustee to legal reprisals, 4 his relationship to
these beneficiaries being purely one of a fiduciary nature.5 5 A trustee
commits a breach of this duty when he uses the trust res for his own
benefit,5 or when he occupies the land for his own purpose.57 Accord-
ingly, the trustee is accountable for any gain derived or liable for
any loss sustained.58 Thus, any use of the trust res by the trustee
adverse to that of the beneficiary is a breach of the trustee's fiduciary
duty of loyalty.
The second major duty of a trustee is the obligation to protect and
preserve the trust corpus.5 9 The power to expend the trust funds is
limited to those expenditures made for the repair and maintenance of
the res60 In an ordinary life estate, that is, one in which there is no
power to consume the corpus, this duty is present even though not
expressly stated. Included within this duty is the obligation to pre-
vent waste, an inherent obligation in the trustee's "duty to preserve.",',
49. Ibid. See also, In re Hays' Estate, 358 Pa. 38, 55 A.2d 763 (1947).
50. Powell's Estate, 340 Pa. 401, 17 A.2d 391 (1941).
51. Graham v. Bryant, 211 Ga. 856, 89 S.E.2d 640 (1955); Burnett v. Quell,
202 S.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. Mo. 1947); In re Stein's Will, 91 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1949).
See also, King v. Hawley, 113 Cal. App. 534, 248 P.2d 491 (1952).
52. 2 Scott, Trusts § 170 (2d ed. 1956). (Emphasis added).
53. Ibid.
54. Id. at § 170.2.
55. Id. at 1193.
56. Id. at § 170.17.
57. Ibid.
58. Id. at § 170.25. See also, Restatement, Trusts § 170, comment 1 (1959).
59. 2 Scott, op. cit. supra note 52, §§ 176, 188.1. See also, e.g., Williams v.
Morrison, 242 Iowa 1054, 48 N.W.2d 666 (1951); Windscheffel v. Wright, 187
Kan. 678, 360 P.2d 178 (1961).
60. 2 Scott, op. cit. supra note 52, § 176.
61. Bliss v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 81 Cal. App. 2d 50, 183 P.2d 312 (1947);
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If acts of waste are committed the trustee and the cestui respectively
are held liable for losses sustained.
In the De Bonchamps case, the duties of protection, preservation
and loyalty, and the task of administering the estate solely for an-
other, which are duties inherent in the trustee and "normal" life
tenant situations, are non-existent. This is because of the power
granted the life tenant to consume the corpus for his need and sup-
port. Prior to the De Bonchamps case, Randall v. Estes 2 held that
where the testatrix devised the estate to her husband for life with
power to sell, encumber or dispose of the entire estate for his sup-
port, comfort and maintenance, with remainder over, the life tenant
was not a trustee or quasi-trustee for the remainderman. The court
further stated that the life tenant is regarded a quasi-trustee to pre-
serve and protect the estate only when the remainderman has a clear
vested indefeasible interest in the property.03 In In re Barnes' Estate,0 4
the life owner was given full power to consume the corpus and at-
tempted to give away the estate. The court held the life tenant a
quasi-trustee only insofar as he is prohibited from recklessly squan-
dering the estate.65
The numerous courts that have regarded the life tenant as quasi-
trustee invariably have done so under circumstances where no power
to consume existed. This is justified since such a tenant possessed the
duty to preserve the corpus.6
Thus it is clear that a governing factor in the courts' categorization
of a life tenant as quasi-trustee rests with his duty of loyalty to pro-
tect and preserve the estate for the remainderman. 0 Consequently,
having the duties of a trustee, the life tenant has been treated as a
trustee by the courts. Clearly then, by the life tenant's acquisition of
the power to consume the estate for his own support, comfort and
Conner v. Bowdoin, 80 Ga. App. 807, 57 S.E.2d 334 (1950); In re Buder, 368 Mo.
796, 217 S.W.2d 563 (1949).
62. 218 S.W.2d 338 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1949).
63. Ibid. See Bienvenu v. First Nat'l Bank, 17 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1941).
64. 108 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio 1950).
65. Id. at 98. See also, Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N.E. 61 (1894);
2 Perry, Trusts § 540 (7th ed. 1929). But cf., Attebury v. Prentice, 158 Neb.
795, 65 N.W.2d 138 (1956).
66. Hart v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1932); Ferguson v. Forst-
mann, 25 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1928); Gaskill v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 507
(N.D. Tex. 1960); King v. Hawley, 113 Cal. App. 534, 248 P.2d 491 (1952);
Hardy v. Mayhew, 158 Cal. 95, 110 Pac. 113 (1910); Windscheffel v. Wright, 187
Kan. 678, 360 P.2d 178 (1961) ; Morrow v. Person, 195 Tenn. 370, 259 S.W.2d 665
(1953).
67. Gaskill v. United States, supra note 66; Warmore v. Gilbert, 51 Ga. 260,
106 S.E.2d 269 (1921) ; Windscheffel v. Wright, supra note 66; Morrow v. Person,
supra note 66.
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maintenance, the above duties vanish, leaving no justification for
regarding the life holder as quasi-trustee. With this thought in mind,
an investigation of other cases follows.
IV. TAXATION OF THE LIFE TENANT
Aside from the De Bonchamps case, there have been few decisions
faced with the problem raised herein, that is, "Is the life tenant with
broad powers to consume the corpus to be taxed as owner or as trustee
for the capital gain derived ?"
In United States v. Cooke,68 a life tenant was given the power to
use and consume the corpus (shares of stock) with remainder follow-
ing. The life holder was held not taxable as owner since "she [was]
not in any way the owner of the shares,"1 nor the resulting capital
gain. Likewise, the life tenant was not taxable as trustee of the
corpus under Section 161 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.70
The decision rested on the interpretation of the term trustee found
within the Code section, and as defined by Treasury Regulations.71
The court found it to pertain only to the ordinary trust which requires
the conservation of the corpus under the customary rules of chan-
cery.72 As a result, the life tenant, not having the property for the
purposes of preservation, was not taxed. The dissenting opinion in
the Cooke case urged that the life tenant should be taxed as owner of
68. 228 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1955).
69. Id. at 670.
70. The section reads:
Imposition of Tax
(a) Application of tax-The taxes imposed by this chapter on indi-
viduals shall apply to the taxable income of estates or of any kind
of property held in trust, including-
(1) income accumulated in the trust for the benefit of unborn or
unascertained persons or persons with contingent interests, and
income accumulated or held for future distribution under the
terms of the will or trust;
(2) income which is to be distributed currently by the fiduciary to
the beneficiaries, and income collected by a guardian of an
infant which is to be held or distributed as the court may
direct; ...
(4) income which, in the discretion of the fiduciary, may be either
distributed to the beneficiaries or accumulated....
71. Treasury Regulation 118, § 39.3797-3. The definition of the term trust
as used in the Internal Revenue Code reads:
The term trust as used in the Internal Revenue Code, refers to an ordinary
trust, namely, one created by will or by declaration of the trustees or the
grantor, the trustees of which take title to the property for the purpose of
protecting or conserving it as customarily required under ordinary rules
applied in chancery and probate courts. (Emphasis added).
72. Ibid.
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the corpus, reasoning that the life tenant had the absolute right of
disposition of the income which was subject to her unfettered com-
mand. Courts have, at times, held a taxpayer liable as owner when
technically he was not. They have concluded that "taxation is not so
much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with the actual
command over the property taxed"73 or that "liability may rest upon
the enjoyment by the taxpayer of privileges ... so substantial . . . as
to make it reasonable and just to deal with him as if he were the
owner... . ,74 Aside from the Cooke dissent, the courts are in accord
in not holding this class of taxpayer as owner of the corpus."
These courts have concluded that the power of the life tenant to
use and consume the corpus was not equivalent to a power to vest in
themselves the corpus of their respective estates.70 Powers normally
inherent in ownership are lacking; that is, this type life tenant has
no power of appointment, nor to give the corpus away, nor to make
testamentary disposition of the corpus 7 Furthermore, reapportion-
ment of the beneficiaries' shares and outright substitution of parties
is prohibited.""
Moreover, the power to consume is expressly limited to those powers
stated within the devise, and is, in essence, the power of the life
tenant to determine for himself his own personal mode of living. Any
interest in the corpus is thereby limited to effectuate such purpose.
Finally, this is not a situation where the failure of the life tenant to
consume part of the estate can be regarded as a gift to the remainder-
men, as would be true with ownership.79
Prior to the De Bonchamps decision, Weil v. United States80 was
decided in the Court of Claims. On facts similar to the Cooke case,
the court held the taxpayer liable for capital gains as fiduciary, while
73. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 580 (1940); Burnet v. Wells, 289
U.S. 670, 678-79 (1933); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Hulbert v.
Commissioner, 227 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1955); Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d
331 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Flato v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Farkus
v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1948); Home Furniture Co., v. Commis-
sioner, 168 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1948); Hallowell v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 536
(3d Cir. 1947); Sewell v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 957 (Ct.Cl. 1947).
74. Burnet v. Wells, supra note 73. See also, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 678.
75. In instances where the life owner is accorded full power over the income
he is deemed owner of the income and taxed thereon. For examples see footnotes
73 & 74 above.
76. United States v. De Bonchamps, 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960); United
States v. Cooke, 228 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Weil v. United States, 180 F. Supp.
407 (Ct.Cl. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960).
77. United States v. De Bonchamps, supra note 76 at 130.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. 180 F. Supp. 407 (Ct.CI. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960).
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at the same time affirming the Cooke majority opinion in not regard-
ing the life holder as owner. 1 Again the interpretation of the term
trustee played the predominant role in the court's decision. That tri-
bunal found the interpretation in the Cooke case too narrow, and
expanded it to include relationships "clothed with the characteristics
of a trust."8 2 Apparently the court either ignored or placed very little
weight on the fact that the life tenant with power to consume was en-
trusted with no duty to protect or preserve the corpus. Instead, the
Court of Claims equated the life tenant and trustee, stating that
neither was able to appropriate the principal, and as an end result held
the taxpayer liable as trustee for the capital gain within Section 641
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.3
In agreement with the Weil case is Security-First Nat'l Bank V.
United States,84 where the testator devised a life estate to his spouse
with power to sell, dispose of and consume so much of the corpus as
needed for her support, comfort and maintenance with remainder
thereafter. Unlike the Cooke case, the devise expressly held the tenant
liable for waste. The Court distinguished the Cooke decision on the
basis of the waste provision stating that the devise in the earlier case
granted broader powers which extended beyond the reach of a suit
for waste 3 This distinction is not well taken since both cases dealt
with capital gain realized through the sale of securities. Waste is a
technical term referring only to a freehold estate and is, therefore,
inapplicable to personalty.88 Consequently, the holding of the case
cannot honestly be given weight as authority contra to the Cooke case.
The Ninth Circuit was so influenced by the decision in the Weil case
that in the De Bonchamps case it reversed its previous position by
choosing to follow the Weil decision rather than their own Cooke
opinion. In finding the life tenant responsible for the tax on capital
gains the court admitted that:
[U]ndue emphasis and significance were read into the regula-
tion's reference to the customary requirements of protection and
conservation. In searching for the meaning of the distinction
which this regulation makes [between ordinary trusts and other
types of trusts], we should be guided by the fact that this is a
tax measure. The distinction intended then should be meaningful
and purposeful in a tax context.8 7
81. Ibid.
82. Id. at 411.
83. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 641.
84. 181 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
85. Id. at 915-16.
86. Caprito v. United States, 217 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1954); Graffell v. Honey-
suckle, 112 Wash. 64, 191 P.2d 858 (1948).
87. United States v. De Bonchamps, 278 F.2d 127, 132 (9th Cir. 1960).
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The tribunal remarked strongly that an active trust is feasible with-
out the inclusion of the normal duties and responsibilities given a
trustee, adding that to ignore such a proposition would exclude prop-
erty otherwise perfectly taxable.88
The Court interpreted the Treasury's definition of the term trustee
as an attempt to distinguish the business trust from the ordinary
trust. This reasoning was founded upon the fact that the definition
was promulgated at a time when the problem of separating business
associations from trusts was dominant, a time almost two decades
after the term first appeared in the code. 9 In the final analysis, the
word ordinary, in the definition of the term trustee, was used to de-
scribe the purpose of the arrangement and not preservation. The
Cooke case was thereby overruled.
The dissenting opinion in the De Bonchamps case was concerned
with the life tenant as trustee of the corpus, and agreed with the
majority in not regarding the life holder as owner. 0 In addition to
affirming the reasoning in the Cooke case, the dissent based its opinion
on a proposed legislative act entitled Trust and Partnership Income
Tax Revision of 1960.91 The purpose of the bill was to amend the very
section of the code so often relied upon by the government, namely,
Section 641 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
In essence the proposed bill8 2 taxes income attributable to the prop-
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Id. at 133.
91. H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). The Bill was withdrawn due to
judicial determination, S.Rep. No. 1616, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1960).
92. The bill read:
TITLE I-EsTATES AND TRUSTS
(Bill Sec. 101)
SEC. 101 ImPosi'ioN OF TAx-AMENDMENTS OF SECTION 641.
(Bill Sec. 101 (a))
(a) Application of Tax.-Section 641 is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new subsection:
'(c) Legal Life Estates and Other Terminable Legal Interests.-If-
'(1) any person owns a legal interest in property which may
terminate on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an
event or contingency, or on failure of an event or con-
tingency to occur, and
'(2) at any time during any calendar year there is gross
income attributable to suck property-
"(A) which (but for this subsection) would not be
currently includible in the gross income of any
person because such person is not then ascertain-
able or for any other reason, but
"(B) which would be currently includible in the gross
income of a trust with respect to such property if
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erty (capital gain) of a life tenant by deeming a trust to exist with
life tenant as fiduciary for the purpose of taxing such gain, which,
but for the new law, would not be taxable unless such a trust existed.93
The dissent thought the majority position untenable during the pen-
dency of the proposed bill. Moreover, the proposed amendment was in
line with past Congressional policy to accord separate treatment to
legal life tenants and trustees.9 4
The most recent case in point was Robinson v. United States,9 5
decided in a Georgia Federal District Court. The facts of the case
were substantially the same as the De Bonchamps case with the ex-
ception that the life tenant here was required "to hold the proceeds
of the sale subject to the remaining interest in the property."9 This
additional factor made this case stronger in light of the government's
contention. Accordingly, the Court followed the authority pronounced
by the Well and De Bonchamps decisions and taxed the life tenant
as quasi-trustee of the corpus.9 7 The lower court adhered to the doc-
trine of stare decisis with open reluctancy, stating: "While this Court
is following the above cited cases [Weil, De Bonchamps, Security-First
Nat'l Bank] it does so with a great deal of hesitancy, for there are
certain considerations that weigh heavily upon the side of a contrary
view."98
The reason for the hesitancy was due primarily to the pendency of
a Congressional Resolution" that would clarify the statute under con-
sideration. 10° Secondly, the court viewed its feelings by raising theories
which cast doubt upon and might logically be more sound than its hold-
ing.10 1 One such theory was apportionment. The Court stated the
sale of such property by the life tenant could have been that of two
separate legal estates-life estate and remainder. As a result, the
capital gain could be apportioned. 10 The second theory of the court
such a trust existed (determined without regard to
subpart E),
then, for purposes of this subchapter and subtitle F, a trust shall
be deemed to exist for such calendar year with respect to all gross
income described in paragraph (2) attributable to such property,
and the person (or persons) described in paragraph (1) shall be
deemed to be a fiduciary of such trust. (Emphasis added.)
93. Shortform explanation of the Congressional Bill cited in footnote 92.
94. United States v. De Bonchamps, 278 F.2d 127, 134 (9th Cir. 1960).
95. 192 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Ga. 1961).
96. Id. at 253.
97. Id. at 254.
98. Ibid.
99. H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). See note 92 supra for text.
100. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 161. (Section 641 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954).
101. Robinson v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 253, 254-55 (N.D. Ga. 1961).
102. Id. at 254.
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concerned the requirement of notice to necessary parties in matters
pertaining to the estate. In a true trustee situation, the fiduciary is
the only necessary party. However, the Court remarked that it could
logically be argued that the life tenant be required to give legal notice
to the remainderman prior to the sale of the corpus.10 3 In so doing
the trust aspect is virtually eliminated. The Court was not required
to make rulings on these self-interposed theories since they were not
made issues by the opposing parties.
The Court eliminated plaintiff's theory of postponement"4 and
found the life holder liable for the tax on capital gain. They reasoned
that the tax would be paid by the life tenant from the proceeds of the
sale and would come out of the increment earned by the corpus. Fur-
thermore payment of the capital gains tax from the corpus would
result in an automatic adjustment between life tenant and remainder-
man.05
V. REMEDIAL LEGISLATION NEEDED
The courts in the Weil, De Bonchamps and Robinson cases had no
legal justification in reaching their separate but like conclusions.
They were correct in not holding the life tenant as owner of the cor-
pus, although historically incorrect in regarding respective life ten-
ants as trustees. Practically speaking, the life tenant should be taxed
for the capital gains earned since he has benefitted or will benefit
from such gain. Furthermore, to disregard collection of this tax
would be contrary to the intent of Congress. Taxing the remainder-
man for such gain is not feasible because of the problem that would
arise if his interest be contingent. In addition, postponement is clearly
not the policy of Congress. 06 The only proper solution to the problem
rests with Congress itself. Congress, with its power to lay and collect
taxes, has the prerogative to choose either alternative they deem
proper. Congress could treat the life tenant with broad powers to
consume the corpus for his support as owner or as trustee of the
estate.
In selecting the manner in which to tax these life tenants, it is the
duty of Congress to ascertain and carry out the devisor's or grantor's
intent in creating such estates. In this regard, the trust label is better
suited. The choice made of granting (or devising) a life estate with
power to consume rather than granting a fee obviates the grantor's
(or devisor's) intent to afford the life tenant almost complete power
103. Id. at 255.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Note, Federal Income Tax-Life Tenant not Liable for Capital Gains,
1956 U. Ill. L. F. 294. See also, Robinson v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 253
(ND. Ga. 1961).
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of disposition, while at the same time enabling the grantor (or de-
visor) to retain control over the disposition of the remainder. An
anomaly is created. Although this is an insufficient rationale to justi-
fiably enable the courts to deem the tenant a trustee, it sheds enough
light on the intent of the grantor to allow Congress to select this
manner of taxation over that of ownership.
Moreover, the implications following taxation as trustee are less
severe and damaging than those in which the life tenant is taxed as
owner. By taxing the life tenant personally as owner, he will consume
a greater portion of the corpus to reimburse himself for any taxes
paid. The end result is forced consumption leaving only a semblance
of the estate for the remainderman. This is contrary to the grantor's
intent. Such consumption would not occur if the tenant were taxed
as trustee, because he would not be taxed personally for the gain.
The problem of selecting how to tax the life tenant is, in essence,
one of choosing the tax bracket to place the tenant within and is
dependent upon the attitude of Congress. Although the standard
fifty per cent deduction is allowable for capital gain in each case when
there is a net long term profit, the tax will be less if computed on a
trust basis.10' This is because the income derived from capital gain
in the trust situation is treated separately from personal income for
tax purposes.
For example, assume a life tenant with broad powers to consume
earns $10,001 per year as personal net income. Further assume a
$10,000 net long term capital gain through the sale of part of the
corpus. Only $5,000 of this gain is attributable to income for taxation
due to the standard deduction (not to be confused with the 10 per cent
standard deduction). If taxed as owner, the $5,000 must be added to
the $10,001 already earned. When so taxed, the tax for the total
$15,001 is $4,730.47 yielding the taxpayer only $10,270.53 net in-
come.'08 Taxed as trustee, his personal tax on the $10,001 is $2,640.38
yielding $7,360.62 and the tax on the $5,000 capital gain is $1,100
yielding $3,900 for a grand total of $11,260.62 net income.'0 9 As
shown, the taxpayer has benefitted greatly by being taxed as trustee.
Choosing the bracket is, therefore, a matter for Congress to decide
in light of the other considerations above mentioned.
In view of the legal findings made herein, it appears necessary for
Congress to enact remedial legislation on the problem of taxing this
type of life tenant. Without such action the courts will, more than
107. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1202. See also, § 642.
108. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1 (a).
109. Ibid.
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likely, continue to follow the Weil, De Bonchamps and Robinson deci-
sions. Congress, in so legislating, should consider the legal history of
the matter, as well as the intent of the parties, the implications in-
volved and the nature of their past attitude in levying taxes in select-
ing the proper alternative.
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